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How valid are these concerns? Do the promises
implicit in the Joint Statement truly reflect US
intentions and will they be translated into actions?
Can the US be trusted on matters that are crucial for
India’s security such as nuclear weapons and
energy? How valid are the fears that the deal would
erode India’s independence of action in world affairs?
These are all genuine worries and need to be
addressed.
This paper will evaluate the progress on the deal
using the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement between
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President
George Bush as the baseline. As the bill introduced
in the Senate remains to be passed, this study will
only analyse the Act passed on July 26, 2006 by the
US House of Representatives.
We shall trace the related developments since July
18, 2005 to assess whether both countries have
adhered to the underlying parameters agreed upon
in the Joint Statement. In so doing we shall also
address the various concerns raised by critics of the
deal and try to see how these could affect the
approaches of the two sides towards the deal. While
it is still too early to comment on the outcome with
any certainty we will try to prioritise the various issues
and concerns in terms of their impact on the ongoing
negotiations between India and the US. Can India
and the US indeed finalise a suitable arrangement
that is satisfactory to both sides?
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1 The Full Text of the United States India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act is available at the Library of Congress site
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:3:./temp/~c109nqU4ln::
2 The Full Text of the Senate Bill (United States India Peaceful Cooperation Atomic Energy Cooperation Act)  is available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s3709pcs.txt.pdf
3 Full Text of the Prime Minister’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006 is available at
http://164.100.24.167/rsdebate/deb_ndx/208/17082006/8to9.htm
Objective of the Study
The Indo-US nuclear deal has generated a heated
debate in India.  The political establishment is divided,
many in the scientific community seem to think that
the deal will erode India’s strategic autonomy and a
number of strategic analysts seem to feel that the
deal will be inimical to India’s long term strategic
interests.  The rhetoric behind the debate does raise
certain fundamental issues about the costs and
benefits of this major bilateral initiative. The debate
so far has been characterized more by ideological
posturing rather than by an objective assessment of
the pros and cons of the deal.
The United States India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act passed on 26 July 2006 in the US
House of Representatives has raised several
questions.1 Many questions have also been raised
on the discrepancies between the Act passed by the
House and the bill introduced in the US Senate2.
According to the legislative process in the US, the
two bills must be reconciled into a single consensus
document before it is sent to the President for his
consent.
There seem to be conflicting interpretations of the
Joint Statement both in India and the US as reflected
in the Act and the Prime Minister’s speech to
Parliament on 17 August 2006.3 Many in India have
commented that the Act passed by the House of
Representatives has altered the goal posts agreed
to in the Joint Statement by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush.
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Background to the Deal
Relations between India and the US in the nuclear
area have largely been based on suspicion and
mutual distrust after Pokhran I resulting in India’s
isolation from the global civil nuclear energy
cooperation regime. Even though by Pokhran II, the
world order had changed with the end of the Cold
War and the demise of the Soviet Union, this distrust
of India continued. In the aftermath of the September
11th event in 2001, there was a change in the US
attitude towards India. The proposed nuclear deal
with the US is the culmination and result of a process
of mutual understanding set in motion in the
aftermath of Pokhran II. Mutual appreciation of each
other’s energy and security needs in the changing
international scenario was an integral part of this
process. Civil nuclear cooperation was identified as
one of the key areas of possible
cooperation in the Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
between India and the US.4  The
process to end India’s isolation from
global nuclear trade regimes is now
underway.
India’s isolation in the nuclear arena for the last three
decades resulted in a self-reliant and original
programme tailor made for meeting Indian
requirements of nuclear power based on domestic
availability of nuclear fuel. India has also pioneered
many innovative approaches to technology
development resulting in a situation where it is a world
leader in some areas. However, India’s nuclear power
programme has not been able to grow at a pace
required to meet the country’s growing needs for
power. It is well known that if a developing country’s
GDP has to grow at six to seven per cent, the power
requirements will have to grow at about ten to twelve
per cent on an annual basis.  Nuclear power should
contribute significantly to this demand for power.
Further, pollution and global warming considerations
may also dictate a greater shift towards nuclear
energy in the power mix of the country. This
evaluation of the deal will take into account all these
factors in the assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages for India.
Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation –
Intentions as reflected in the Joint
Statement
The US position on the civil nuclear agreement as
reflected in the Joint Statement is as follows.
“President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the
Prime Minister over India’s strong commitment
to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that
as a responsible state with advanced
nuclear technology, India should
acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other such states. The
President told the Prime Minister that
he would work to achieve full civil
nuclear energy cooperation with India
as it realizes its goals of promoting
nuclear power and achieving energy security. The
President would also seek agreement from
Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and
the United States will work with friends and allies
to adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India,
including but not limited to expeditious
consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded
nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the
United States will encourage its partners to also
consider this request expeditiously. India has
expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness
to contribute. The United States will consult with
its partners considering India’s participation. The
4 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee  statement on, “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with USA”, Statement by Prime
Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, 13 January 2004 available at http://meaindia.nic.in/sshome.htm
Civil nuclear cooperation was
identified as one of the key
areas of possible cooperation
in the Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) between
India and the US.
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The last sentence of President Bush’s statement
talks about the Generation 1V International Forum
and US intentions of consulting with its partners to
include India as a part of this forum.
India has made the following statement with regard
to Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation:
“The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part,
India would reciprocally agree that it would be
ready to assume the same responsibilities and
practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technology, such as the United
States. These responsibilities and practices
consist of identifying and separating civilian and
military nuclear facilities and programs in a
phased manner and filing a declaration regarding
its civilians facilities with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place
voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional
Protocol with respect to civilian
nuclear facilities; continuing India’s
unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing; working with the United States
for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material
Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
states that do not have them and supporting
international efforts to limit their spread; and
ensuring that the necessary steps have been
taken to secure nuclear materials and technology
through comprehensive export control legislation
and through harmonization and adherence to
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.”6
In the first sentence Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
mentions that India would reciprocally agree that it
5 The Full Text of the Indo-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 is available at
http://meaindia.nic.in//speech/2005/07/18js01.htm
6 Ibid.
United States will consult with the other
participants in the Generation IV International
Forum with a view toward India’s inclusion.”5
It is clear from the first sentence of President Bush’s
statement that in view of India’s non-proliferation
credentials, the US regards India as a responsible
state. It also recognizes India as a responsible state
with advanced nuclear technology and it should
therefore be treated on par with other states that are
like India.
In the second sentence the US President makes it
clear that the US is interested in working with India
to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation to
meet India’s growing energy requirements and for
achieving energy security.
In the next sentence President Bush talks of three
things.
Seeking agreement from the Congress to
amend US laws and policies to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and
trade with India;
Working with friends and
allies to enable full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India;
and
To include expeditious fuel supplies to
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur as a
part of this arrangement.
The President then mentions that the US will
encourage its partners to consider the request for
fuel supplies to Tarapur expeditiously.
The fifth and sixth sentences talk about India’s
interest in participating in the ITER and the US
intention of helping India to become a member of
the ITER.
US recognizes India as a
responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology
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7 Ibid.
8 See NSG Press Release available at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/2006-07-Brasilia.pdf
9 Full Text of the Separation Plan is available at http://www.dae.gov.in/press sepplan.pdf#search=%22Joint%20Statement%20%2
B%2018%20July%202005%22
10 Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005. Full Text available
at http://meaindia.nic.in/
would be ready to assume the same responsibilities
and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced
nuclear technology, such as the United States.
Next he goes on to elaborate what these
responsibilities and practices are.
Identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and programs in a phased
manner;
filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities
with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA);
taking a decision to place
voluntarily its civilian nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards;
signing and adhering to an
Additional Protocol with respect
to civilian nuclear facilities;
continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing;
working with the United States for the conclusion
of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
refraining from transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not
have them and supporting international efforts
to limit their spread; and ensuring that the
necessary steps have been taken to secure
nuclear materials and technology through
comprehensive export control legislation and
through harmonization and adherence to Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.”7
Progress on the Ground
The US President had committed to amending
relevant US laws, and NSG guidelines to enable Indo-
US civil nuclear cooperation.
This process has started in the US with the
amendment of the US Atomic Energy Act of
1954 and the passage of United States India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act in the
House of Representatives on July 26, 2006.
The US has also requested its NSG partners to
initiate discussions with India on amending their
guidelines. At a plenary meeting in Brasilia on
1-2 June, 2006, the NSG members discussed
“the possible NSG-India relationship regarding
civilian nuclear cooperation”.8  This process will
be continued at the next regular NSG
Consultative Group meeting.
India has already become a full
member of the ITER.
On its part, pursuant to the Joint
Statement:
India has provided a Separation plan
demarcating its military and civilian facilities.9
Based on US initiatives, it has entered into
discussion with the IAEA on the details on an
India-specific Additional Protocol. It has also
been in touch with NSG members.
India remains committed to its unilateral
moratorium on testing, and negotiating an
FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva.
India has already harmonized its export control
laws in accordance with the MTCR and NSG
guideline by passing the WMD Act in June
2005.10
Concerns raised in India by the United
States India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act, 2006
There are many concerns raised by the members of
The US President had
committed to amending
relevant US laws, and NSG
guidelines to enable Indo-US
civil nuclear cooperation.
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11 See for example, Arun Shourie, “Parity, did you say?” The Indian Express, 23 August 2006,Yashwant Sinha, “The Questions PM
Did Not Answer”  The Asian Age,  21 August 2006 and K C Pant, “Time for Parliament to Step In” The Hindu, 25 July 2006.
12 For an analysis of the legal implications of amending the NPT to include India as a Nuclear Weapon State see Abu Mathen,
“Playing the Nuclear End Game”, NIAS Working Paper, (forthcoming)
13 PM’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17th August 2006. n.3
14 While in a strict legal sense India may not qualify as a Nuclear Weapon State, for all practical purposes India is a nuclear weapon
state after Pokhran II. The term “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” provides theway to give tacit recognition to
India’s nuclear weapons programme without violating any basic tenet of the NPT.
academia and scientific community in India with
regard to the form and content of the United
States India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act passed in the US House of Representatives on
26 July 2006. These concerns are addressed
below.
Does the deal make India a Nuclear
Weapon State?
Many political leaders and strategic analysts in India
have criticized the deal for not conferring the status
of a Nuclear Weapon State on India as a part of the
Indo-US deal.11 Is conferring of a Nuclear Weapon
State status on India a part of the deal as envisioned
in the Joint Statement?
The term Nuclear Weapon State has
a very specific meaning in the
international legal regime.12 As per the
NPT only those countries that
exploded a nuclear device prior to
January 1, 1967 qualify as Nuclear
Weapon States.  Nowhere in the Joint Statement or
in the House of Representatives Act has India been
referred to as a Nuclear Weapon State. In the light
of this, how do we interpret President Bush identifying
India as “a responsible state with advanced nuclear
technology” to be treated on par “with other such
states”?
The US President has clearly not identified India as
a Nuclear Weapon State or as a Non-nuclear
Weapon State. He has de facto put India into a third
category of states that are “responsible states with
advanced nuclear technology”.
This categorization raises two important issues with
regard to the Indian nuclear program. The first relates
to the legitimacy of India’s possession of nuclear
weapons. The second relates to the nature and scope
of any safeguards agreement that may be required
for international civil nuclear cooperation. The Prime
Minister has also clarified in Parliament that:
“The July Statement did not refer to India as a
Nuclear Weapon State because that has a
particular connotation. Since the NPT could not
be amended we could not claim that we will get
the formal status of the Nuclear Weapon States.
But the July Statement explicitly recognizes the
existence of India’s military nuclear facilities. It
also meant that India would not attract fullscope
safeguards such as those applied to
Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are
signatories to the NPT and there
would be no curbs on continuation of
India’s nuclear weapons related
activities.”13
The House of Representatives Act provides details
of how the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, would be
amended to take care of civil nuclear cooperation
with India. From the amendments to the Act, it would
appear that the US does recognize India as a de
facto but not a de jure Nuclear Weapon State.14
Will the deal have an adverse impact on
India’s development of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems?
In the context of the Indo-US deal, strategic autonomy
refers to independence of India’s decision making
Nowhere in the Joint
Statement or in the House of
Representatives Act has India
been referred to as a Nuclear
Weapon State.
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with regard to its strategic programmes.15 Through
the Separation Plan India’s strategic programmes
have been exempted from any oversight by any
external agency or power. As agreed to in the Joint
Statement, there is a mention in the Separation Plan
that the identified civil nuclear facilities would come
under the purview of IAEA safeguards. There is an
understanding between India and the US that India
will keep its military facilities outside the safeguarded
domain. There is also no restriction on India expanding
its military facilities. The cooperation with regard to
nuclear technology, reactors, and nuclear fuel would
be restricted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
A close reading of the United States India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act passed by the House of
Representatives indicates that India can develop its
nuclear arsenal within the facilities that it has declared
to be military.  Sections 123 and 128 of the US Atomic
Energy Act deal with US nuclear
cooperation and export to other
countries. These Sections stipulate
that the US will not enter into any
cooperation with a “Non-Nuclear
Weapon State” that does not accept
“fullscope safeguards” or has activities that would
imply non-peaceful uses of nuclear technology.16
Section 123 a (2) of the US Atomic Energy Act has
been waived with regard to India.17 By waiving this
Section, the US eliminates the application of fullscope
safeguards (applicable to Non Nuclear Weapon
States) as a precondition for cooperation with India.
Thus the US de facto recognizes the existence of
the Indian nuclear weapons program.  Section 128
has also been waived with regard to India.  This builds
upon the waiver of Section 123 a (2) and allows for
15 For a view that the deal compromises India’s strategic autonomy see Bharat Karnad, “PM is Risking National Interest”, The Asian
Age, 25 August 2006 and Satish Chandra, Ajit Doval and Vikram Sood, “N-Deal is an Unmitigated Disaster”, The Asian Age
15 August 2006. Also see “Appeal to Parliamentarians”, Deccan Herald, 15 August 2006. This is an open letter to Indian
Parliament released by a group of former members of Indian Nuclear Programme. These scientists are Dr. H N Sethna, Dr. M R
Srinivasan, Dr. P K Iyengar, Dr. A Gopalakrishnan, Dr. S L Kati, Dr. A N Prasad, Dr. Placid Rodriguez and Dr. Y S R Prasad.
16 Put simply if a country was not one of the five nuclear weapon powers (US, Russia, UK, France and China) the US would not
co-operate with it unless it placed all its nuclear facilities under safeguards. These amendments make India an exception to this
US Policy.
17 The Full Text of the US Atomic Energy Act is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/
ml022200075-vol1.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&page=14
export of nuclear material and technology to India
even though all Indian nuclear activities may not
come under IAEA safeguards.
However, waiver of Section 128 is subject to certain
conditions that are mentioned in Section 129 of the
same Act. These are that
(a) India shall not conduct a new nuclear weapons
test,
(b) it shall not terminate, abrogate or materially violate
an IAEA safeguards agreement and
(c) it shall not transfer weapons technology to Non-
Nuclear Weapon States.
By waiving Section 129 (1) (A) of the Atomic Energy
Act “for any activity that occurred on or before July
18, 2005” the US recognizes the legitimacy of India’s
nuclear weapons tests starting from 1974 up to 2005.
The US has also waived Section 129 (1) (D). This
allows India to continue its
development of nuclear weapons.
Additionally, 129 (2) (C) has also been
waived with regard to India. This
allows India to engage in trade in
nuclear materials, reprocessing
technology and allows India’s participation in all
cooperative activities in the civilian nuclear field.
It would appear from this analysis that there are no
restrictions placed on India for the development of
the current generation of nuclear weapons.
Does the deal constrain India’s
independence to test further?
Many members of the political and scientific
communities are concerned that the deal would
There are no restrictions placed
on India for the development
of the current generation of
nuclear weapons.
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in case India tests again. This issue needs to be
resolved in a manner acceptable to both sides.
Does the deal cap India’s fissile material
stockpiles?
Many people in India have expressed concerns about
US laws that attempt to cap India’s fissile material
stockpile as part of the deal.22 The Act mentions a
multilateral, regional as well as a unilateral
moratorium on production of fissile material by India.
The Act urges for “a moratorium on production of
fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by
India, Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China
at the earliest possible date.”23 The Act also talks
about the steps that the US should
take to encourage India to unilaterally
stop production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister
in his statement to Parliament has
explicitly addressed this concern. He
clarified “We are only committed to negotiate a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, a commitment which was
undertaken by the previous government. India is
willing to join only a non-discriminatory, multi-laterally
negotiated and internationally verifiable FMCT as and
when it is concluded in the Conference on
Disarmament, again provided our security interests
are fully addressed.”24 This clearly states that India
will not entertain any attempts for a unilateral
or regional moratorium on its fissile material
production.
18 See for example Bharat Karnad, “PM is Risking National Interest”, The Asian Age, 25 August 2006, “Appeal to Parliamentarians”
Deccan Herald, 15 August 2006. Also see M R Srinivasan’ s interview in The Hindu titled“ Safeguards, end to US Restrictions
must be interlocking actions”, 27 July 2006.
19 See Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation, 17 May 1998.
Available at http://www.ipcs.org/newDatabaseIndex3.jsp?check=90&database=1005
20 While it may not be necessary to conduct further tests for the development of the current generation of nuclear weapons, the
possibility of further tests for new kinds of weapons cannot be completely ruled out. There is no information in the public domain
that could help us take a clearer position on this issue.
21 PM’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006. n.3
22 M R Srinivasan’s interview in The Hindu titled “Safeguards, End to US restrictions must be interlocking actions”, 27 July 2006.
23 This only looks like a theoretical possibility given the current regional situation. It is unlikely that India, China and Pakistan will
agree to such a regional arrangement unless it is clearly and explicitly linked to a global multilateral treaty.
24 PM’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006. n.3
constrain India’s options to conduct further nuclear
tests.18 In the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has mentioned the
“continuation of India’s unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing”. India declared a unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing after Pokhran II in
1998. It also said that the Pokhran II explosions had
provided sufficient technical data to design, refine
and develop the weapons required for India’s nuclear
arsenal.19 However, if there is a change in the
international geo-political environment warranting the
development of new kinds of nuclear weapons further
tests cannot be ruled out.20 In such a situation India
should have the freedom to respond appropriately.
In his address to Parliament, the PM specifically
referred to the proposed linkage
between further nuclear tests and
continuation of civil nuclear
cooperation. He stated:
“The US has been intimated that
reference to nuclear detonation in the India US
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement as a
condition for future cooperation is not acceptable
to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a
unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing
as indicated in the July statement.” 21
This means that any condition in the Indo-US Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that links “further
testing and cooperation” will not be acceptable to
India. The US House of Representatives Act, as it
stands, asks the President to take action against India
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What is the meaning of full civil nuclear
cooperation?
Concerns have been raised about the nature of “full”
civil nuclear cooperation with the US.  Many in India
feel that India will not be a full and equal partner of
the US.27 One can interpret “full” civil nuclear
cooperation to include all nuclear activities starting
from the mining of ores to the production of power
and the reprocessing of the spent fuel. This
Figure 1: Nuclear Fuel Cycle
25 Even without the deal India uses its available nuclear fuel both for the production of power as well as for the development and
stockpiling of nuclear weapons. One would logically assume that the Separation Plan should take care of Indian needs for the
current generation of weapons along with some margins of safety for meeting possible future requirements.
26 The FMCT negotiations have been going on without much progress in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva since
1994. There is no consensus on the nature and scope of a proposed FMCT.
27 See for example, A. Gopalakrishnan, “Last Chance for the US to Decide”, The Asian Age, 23 August 2006.
The analysis also suggests that India can build up
its nuclear arsenal and fissile material stocks subject,
of course, to certain international developments such
as the conclusion of a FMCT.25 One can also state
with a fair degree of confidence that the prospects
of a multilateral internationally acceptable FMCT do
not appear to be very bright. 26 It would, therefore, be
logical to conclude that concerns related to the FMCT
limiting India’s stockpiles of fissile material might be
overstated.
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interpretation would bring both enrichment and
reprocessing technologies within the ambit of “full”
cooperation. Alternatively, one can interpret “full” to
include only the supply of fuel and reactors and the
storage of the spent fuel, as has been the practice
of US cooperation with many non-weapon states.
Figure 1 explains in detail the steps in going from
the mining of uranium ore to production of power
and the reprocessing of the spent fuel. One can see
through this diagram that there are a large number
of activities that could, in principle, be covered under
the term “full” cooperation. However, from a practical-
technical point of view the most important
requirements for producing power are the supply of
nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors to burn the fuel, and
ways of dealing with the spent fuel whether through
storage or reprocessing. The US is of the view that
enrichment technology does not constitute an
essential part of the value chain for
producing power. The US also does
not consider reprocessing of the
spent fuel as essential for the
production of power.
In view of the fact that India is neither
a Nuclear Weapon State nor a
Non-Nuclear Weapon State but falls in a new
category called “responsible state with advanced
nuclear technology”, the issue of what constitutes
“full” civil nuclear cooperation has to be specified
during negotiations.  While the Joint Statement does
not elaborate upon what constitutes “full” civil nuclear
cooperation, the Prime Minister in his address to
Parliament spelt out his understanding of full
cooperation.
“First, there is the question of full Civil Nuclear
Cooperation. Honourable Members have asked
28 PM’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006. n.3
29 Cited in US House of Representatives Report 109-590 on the United States India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
The Report is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp109:FLD010:@1(hr590)
what is my understanding of that. I would like to
share what our approach is and what our
understanding is by the meaning of full Civil
Nuclear Cooperation. The central imperative in
our discussion with the United States on Civil
Nuclear Cooperation is to ensure the complete
and irreversible removal of existing restrictions
imposed on India through iniquitous restrictive
trading regimes for the past three decades. We
seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of
cooperation and technology transfers pertaining
to Civil Nuclear Energy that is ranging from the
supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors to
reprocessing spent fuel that is all aspects of a
complete nuclear fuel cycle.” 28
However, whether the US will give India all these
technologies is far from certain. Till now the Bush
administration has stated that transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment
technology will not be a part of the
bilateral agreement. In response to a
question posed by Senator Lugar on
Indo-US Nuclear Deal in the House
International Relations Committee,
the Bush administration responded,
“We have also indicated to our NSG
partners that we do not intend to transfer enrichment
or reprocessing technologies. Our bilateral
agreement will not permit such transfers.” 29  This
indicates that there is a divergence of views between
India and the US on what constitutes full civil nuclear
cooperation. In the light of the Prime Minister’s
statement mentioned above, it would seem that for
India while enrichment technology may not form a
part of full civil nuclear cooperation, reprocessing
technologies would certainly come under the
category “full civil nuclear cooperation”. For the US
neither enrichment nor reprocessing technologies
It is essential that India is able
to either reprocess the spent
fuel for use in another
safeguarded reactor or return
it to the supplier state.
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30  For a representative exposition of these arguments see Siddharth Varadarajan,  “Questions Arise on Reprocessing Restrictions”
The Hindu, 28 July 2006 and N S Rajaram, “Nuclear Deal the Untold Story”, The Hindu, 20 August 2006. For a critique of the
nuclear deal and India’s energy security see A Gopalakrishnan, “Energy Security As Scapegoat” The Asian Age, 14 August 2006.
31 PM’s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006. n.3
32 S. Banerjee, “Prospects for Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation”, in K.P. Vijayalakshmi, Arvind Kumar, Sonika Gupta &
S. Chandrashekar (Eds.), Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations (Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies, 2006),
pp.192-205.
33 “Appeal to Parliamentarians”, Deccan Herald, 15 August 2006.
would come under the ambit of “full civil nuclear
cooperation.”
However, from a practical point of view it is essential
that India is able to either reprocess the spent fuel
for use in another safeguarded reactor or return it to
the supplier state. This issue has to be resolved for
the agreement to be acceptable to India.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Concerns have been expressed that the cooperation
will increase India’s dependence on a US-led nuclear
fuel cycle.30 These stem from fears that such
cooperation may result in a uranium-led fuel cycle
dominating the production of power. As a
consequence the indigenous three-phased approach
that would maximally utilize India’s
large thorium reserves would get
downgraded because of inadequate
political and managerial support.
Addressing these concerns, the PM
said in his address to Parliament, “the
integrity of our three stage nuclear
programme will not be affected. The autonomy of
our research and development activity, the
development of the fast breeder and thorium
technology in the nuclear field will remain
unaffected.”31
 Which particular fuel cycle dominates in the
production of power will be determined largely by
commercial considerations. There are also technical
and commercial factors that might actually make
it attractive to have a number of fuel cycles
working together in the commercial realm.32
Decisions related to protecting the Indian three-
stage fuel cycle are completely outside the proposed
cooperation arrangements. These decisions are
dependant upon the Government of India and the
organizations involved in the nuclear area. It is
contingent upon them to protect critical areas of
technology, which have both military and commercial
potential.
Would the deal adversely affect India’s
Research and Development in nuclear
science and technology?
In a letter to Parliament that was released to the Press
a group of eminent scientist had expressed the
concern that “the Indo-US deal in the form approved
by the US House of Representatives infringes on our
independence for carrying out
research and development (R&D) in
nuclear science & technology. Our
R&D should not be hampered by
external supervision and control, or
by the need to satisfy any
international body.”33
There are two broad categories of research; applied
research and basic or fundamental research.  The
Separation Plan protects nuclear activities that would
be important both from strategic and commercial
considerations. The Fast Breeder technology
programme falls outside the civilian domain. One
would expect that Bhaba Atomic Research Centre
(BARC) and other critical facilities would also be
outside the purview of international safeguards. The
list of nine R&D institutions included in the Separation
Plan are entities that deal only with basic and
Decisions related to protecting
the Indian three-stage fuel
cycle are completely outside
the proposed cooperation
arrangements.
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equipment it should not be subject to international
safeguards.
All Non-Nuclear Weapon States engaged in
international nuclear cooperation enter into a
fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The
Nuclear Weapon States, on the other hand, have the
liberty to enter into a voluntary safeguards agreement
on a case-by-case basis with the IAEA.
Prior to 1997, Information Circular (INFCIRC) 15336
formed the basis for all safeguards agreements
between the Non-Nuclear Weapon States signatories
to the NPT and the IAEA. In 1997 an
Additional Protocol INFCIRC 540 was
negotiated. 37
The provisions of this Additional
Protocol cover all activities related to
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (including
R&D) from the mining of ores to the processing of
the spent fuel. The scope and nature of the inspection
and verification provisions specified under this
protocol are significantly more intrusive, making it
much more difficult for a non-nuclear weapon state
to engage in clandestine activities.
The foreword to the Model Protocol (INFCIRC 540)
also talks about its applicability to different kinds of
states. INFCIRC 540 is a Model Protocol that could
be followed for safeguards agreements with all states
including nuclear weapon states. However, there are
major differences in how the Model Protocol is
applied to Non-Nuclear Weapon States and Nuclear
Weapon States. All provisions of the Model Protocol,
without exception, are applicable to Non-Nuclear
34 These are (a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, (b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, (c) Saha Institute of Nuclear
Physics, (d) Institute for Plasma Research, (e) Institute of Mathematical Sciences, (f) Institute of Physics (g) Tata Memorial
Centre, (h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology, (i) Harish Chandra Research Institute. As mentioned in the Separation
Plan. n.9  available at http://www.hindu.com/2006/03/08/stories/2006030808431100.htm
35 “Appeal to Parliamentarians”, Deccan Herald, 15 August 2006.
36 Full Text of INFCIRC 153 is available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf153.shtml
37 Full Text of INFCIRC 540 is available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf#search=%22INFCIRC%20540%22
fundamental R&D.34 There is, therefore, no reason
why these facilities should come under the purview
of IAEA or any other international policing authority.
Does the Deal facilitate foreign access
to sensitive Indian technology?
Does the deal facilitate or even require foreign access
to sensitive Indian technology? Sensitivity can have
two component; military or commercial. The
Separation Plan has explicitly protected the military
component very clearly from international inspection
or interference. There are technologies, like the Fast
Breeder Reactor technology that are
dual use and that may also have large
commercial value. These are also
protected under the Separation Plan.
Further, India has the right to declare
any new facilities as either civilian or
military. It would therefore appear that
as it stands the proposed agreement does not
provide foreign access to sensitive India technology.
Does the nature and scope of the
proposed safeguards adversely affect the
Indian Nuclear Programme?
Some scientists have raised the following concerns
with regard to safeguards. “Safeguards are
understandable where external assistance for
nuclear materials or technologies are involved. We
have agreed to these before, and we can continue
to agree to this in the future too, but strictly restricted
to those facilities and materials imported from
external sources.”35 This would imply that if any
civilian facility did not use imported material or
INFCIRC 153 and the
complete provisions of
INFCIRC 540 applicable to
Non Nuclear Weapon States
should not apply to India.
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The use of the word “voluntarily” in the Joint
Statement has been used to argue for the adoption
of “voluntary” safeguards by India. This argument is
also extended to make a case for a Nuclear Weapon
State status for India. One can see clearly that this
was not the intention expressed either by India or
the US in the Joint Statement. As mentioned earlier,
India falls into a new category of states. This has
also been clarified by the Prime Minister in his
statement to Parliament. Insistence
on the condition that safeguards will
apply only to civilian facilities that use
imported fuel or equipment is clearly
not in consonance with India’s
commitment in the Joint Statement.
If India goes back on this commitment it may be
difficult for the Bush administration to sell the deal to
the US Congress and the NSG.
Does the deal impact the independence
of India’s foreign policy and specifically
its relations with Iran?
The debate on the deal has centered on the possibility
of the US arm-twisting India to support it in its
attempts to rein in Iran. Many people also believe
that the deal will constrain the conduct of India’s
foreign policy and subject it to US control. 39
The House of Representatives Act on stipulates the
following:
“The US shall secure India’s full and active
participation in US’ efforts to dissuade, isolate,
and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for
its efforts to acquire WMD, including a nuclear
38 The version of the bill introduced in the Senate (United States India Peaceful Cooperation Atomic Energy Cooperation Act) does
mention INFCIRC 540. It states, “the term “Additional Protocol’’ means a protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information
circular (INFCIRC) 540.” However, this bill has not yet been passed by the Senate. In case this provision is retained in the final
version of the bill, it would amount to a violation of the Joint Statement and the Separation Plan.  The Full Text of the Senate Bill
is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s3709pcs.txt.pdf
39 See for example Prakash Karat, “Nuclear Deal: Why Avoid Sense of Parliament?”,  The Hindu, 12 August 2006.
Weapon States. A Nuclear Weapon State, on the
other hand could selectively choose those parts of
the Model Protocol which it felt could help in the
control of proliferation. The foreword also recognizes
the existence of “other states” that are neither
Nuclear Weapon States nor Non-Nuclear Weapon
States with whom also an  additional protocol can be
negotiated and for which the Model Protocol could
be used as a basis for arriving at a safeguards
agreement.
Since the coming into force of
INFCIRC 540 and as of 7th February
2005, 57 Additional Protocols have
been approved by the Board of IAEA.
All the Nuclear Weapon States (US, Russia, UK,
France and China) have signed Additional Protocols
with the IAEA.
If the Indo-US nuclear deal goes through, India will
fall into a new category and an India-specific
safeguards regime will have to be negotiated with
the IAEA. INFCIRC 153 and the complete provisions
of INFCIRC 540 applicable to Non Nuclear Weapon
States should not apply to India. The Act passed in
the House of Representatives does not refer to
INFCIRC 153 or INFCIRC 540 that demands the
application of full scope safeguards not only to
nuclear materials and facilities but to all aspects of a
nuclear fuel cycle.38
There also seems to be a lot of confusion with regard
to the interpretation of India’s declaration on
safeguards in the Joint Statement. The Joint
Statement says, “taking a decision to place voluntarily
its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.”
India and the US have broadly
the same goals with respect to
controlling proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other
WMDs.
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40 The United States India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, n.1
41 Ibid.
42 Text of  Statement of Interdiction Principles is available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm
“induce the country to give greater political and
material support to the achievement of the US’
global and regional non-proliferation objectives
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating,
and if necessary sanctioning and containing
States that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups
that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability and the other WMD capability and the
means to deliver such weapons”. 41
This only refers to broad contours of cooperation in
non-proliferation and does not bind
India to any specific course of action.
The Prime Minister has categorically
ruled out the introduction of any
prescriptive suggestions with regard
to Iran specifically or to our foreign
policy in the bilateral agreement. This clarifies that
no legislation in the US Congress is binding on India
unless it is reflected in the final bilateral agreement.
Will the deal force India to join the
Proliferation Security Initiative?
There have been concerns raised about India
subscribing to the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). The main purpose of this US-led initiative has
been to use military and other tools available with
states to interdict shipments of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and missile related equipment and
technologies. As of now, it is not a formal treaty that
a state joins. It is rather the commitment that a state
makes to a Statement of Interdiction Principles.42
The operating elements of the PSI do raise certain
legal issues such as the liability that a state incurs
under international law for unlawful boarding and
seizure. Till now India has neither criticized nor
weapons capability (including the capability to
enrich or process nuclear material), and the
means to deliver WMD.”40
In the Joint Statement of 18th July 2005,Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to  “refraining from
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
to States that do not have them and supporting
international effort to limit their spread and ensuring
that the necessary steps have been taken to secure
nuclear materials and technology through
comprehensive export control
legislation and through harmonization
and adherence to Missile Technology
Control Regimes (MTCR) and
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines.”
India and the US, therefore, have broadly the same
goals with respect to controlling proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other WMDs. The issue of
India’s relations with Iran involves many dimensions
including issues related to nuclear weapons and
other WMDs. Through the passage of the WMD Act,
India is committed to containing and preventing the
proliferation of WMDs regardless of the conclusion
of the nuclear deal between India and the US. How
India will act and intervene with issues related to
Iran’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons and
WMDs could and should be worked out on a case-
by case basis. Any action taken by India with regard
to Iran’s acquisition of WMD capability should
conform to the broad contours of the WMD Act.
Ideally such actions and interventions should take
place in cooperation with other members of the
international community including the US. The
expectation of the US from India as a result of deal
as stated in the Act is to
An Annual Review will turn a
permanent waiver of restriction
on India into an annual ritual
in the US Congress.
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Conclusion
From the above analysis, it would appear that there
are four main areas in the deal on which India and
US need to align their respective positions to be
compatible with the Joint Statement.
There seems to be some divergence of views on the
question of further nuclear testing by
India. While India has committed to
the continuation of its unilateral
moratorium, any mention of a “no
weapon test” in the final agreement
would be unacceptable to India. The
US House of Representatives Act
directly links the continuation of the
cooperation with a “no weapons test” provision.
Section 129 of the US Atomic Energy Act does
provide for an exception in the event of a further
nuclear test by India, though this exception depends
upon the discretion of the President of the US. 45  This
may not be a good enough guarantee for continued
nuclear cooperation in case India decides to test.
Further, Section 129(1) talks about nuclear
detonation by “Non-Nuclear Weapons States” and
therefore its provisions cannot be applicable to India,
which is neither a “Non Nuclear Weapon State” nor
a “Nuclear Weapon State.” Other provisions of
Section 129 that apply to “Non-Nuclear Weapons
States”, i.e. Section 129 (1) (D)46 and Section 129
(2) (C)47 have already been waived for India. It would
be in the fitness of things to waive Section 129 (1)
with regard to India. This would ensure that the US
Atomic Energy Act, as applicable to India, is
43 Collin Powell made this statement during his visit to India as Secretary of State in March 2004. It was widely reported both by
Indian and American print and visual media.
44 PM”s Speech in Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006. n.3
45 Section 129 states that in event of the detonation of a nuclear explosive device, all nuclear exports would cease “unless the
President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States’ non-
proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” n.17
46 Allowing India to continue with its nuclear weapons programme.
47 Allowing India to sell nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapons states under safeguards.
endorsed the PSI though it does have an interest in
preventing clandestine WMD shipments to countries
in its region. The US has expressed an interest in
India becoming an active member of the PSI and
playing the role of a ‘regional policeman’.43 India has
now agreed to discuss the PSI with the US. India
should examine carefully the decision-making
procedures to be adopted within the PSI especially
those related to interdiction before it
takes a position on this issue.
The Prime Minister in his statement
to Parliament clarified that PSI was
“an extraneous issue as it is outside
the framework of the July 18 Joint
Statement. Therefore we cannot
accept it as a condition for implementing the July
Statement.” 44
Annual Review Process
Many people have argued that the Annual Review
process that requires the US President to report to
the Congress on India’s nuclear programme will
impact India adversely. Such a review will turn a
permanent waiver of restriction on India into an
annual ritual in the US Congress. While there is no
reporting obligation on India under this Act, it does
raise the level of uncertainty with regard to proposed
commercial and other arrangements under the deal.
Taking note of these concerns, the Prime Minister in
his statement to Parliament has categorically said
that an Annual Review process as a condition for
the cooperation is not acceptable to India.
The challenge is to come up
with a framework that does not
explicitly demand a
moratorium on further Indian
tests and also satisfies the US
Congress’ concerns.
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congruent with President Bush’s categorization of
India as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear
technology.”
Will the US Congress agree to an implicit policy of
allowing India to test further without recourse to some
preventive and possibly punitive action on the part
of the US? This is the billion-dollar question. One
option would be for the final agreement between the
two sides to remain silent on this issue allowing both
sides the freedom to interpret it within their own
political contexts. However, while this avoids the
problem in the bilateral agreement, any stipulation
in the amended Atomic Energy Act that any new
detonation will invite sanctions may not be acceptable
to India. The challenge before the Bush
administration and the Manmohan
Singh government is to come up with
a framework that does not explicitly
demand a moratorium on further
Indian tests and also satisfies the US
Congress’ concerns.
The definition of “full” civil nuclear cooperation needs
to be clarified by both sides as there seem to be
differing understandings of this term by the two
parties. Since the nature of “full” cooperation was
not defined in the Joint Statement, its scope is open
to interpretation by both sides. The Indian argument
for the transfer of reprocessing technology arises
from energy and environmental security concerns.
While enrichment may not be essential for the
commercial power production industry in India,
reprocessing spent fuel is seen to be essential. The
US seems to prefer keeping both enrichment and
reprocessing technologies outside the proposed
nuclear cooperation
From the PM’s statement in Parliament it would seem
that India is keen to push for transfer of reprocessing
technology. However, there is no such indication
regarding enrichment technology from the Prime
Minister. Unless India can reprocess safeguarded
spent fuel in safeguarded reprocessing facilities, it
will be saddled with massive amounts of spent fuel
that will be an environmental liability and a security
risk. The final agreement between India and the US
must be explicit on the nature and scope of “full”
cooperation. Ideally, the final agreement must satisfy
India’s political concerns of “full” cooperation as well
as its energy and security concerns with regard to
spent fuel.
There is also widespread concern in India on the
independence of its foreign policy with regard to Iran.
This issue begs the question whether US policy on
Iran runs contrary to Indian interests. At present, there
is a convergence of interest between India and the
US in ensuring that Iran does not go
nuclear. However, in principle India is
free to decide upon any strategy of
its choice to achieve this objective. It
appears that over-enthusiasm on part
of the US Congress by raising this
issue explicitly in the Act, might
actually cost the Bush administration much needed
support that India would be willing to offer, keeping
in mind its own national interest. Needless to say,
any provision in the final agreement tying India down
to a specific course of action would make the deal
politically unviable in India.
Finally, there is the question of the Annual Review of
nuclear cooperation with India. The introduction of
the Annual Review process in the Act, diminishes
the stature of what was envisioned as a partnership
of equals in the Joint Statement to a mere patron-
client relationship. It also introduces an element of
uncertainty in the fulfilling of the commercial potential
of the deal. While the Review process places no
reporting obligations on India, the Indian Government
must take it up and get it resolved in its favour. The
US Congress might want to exercise authority upon
the implementation of the civil nuclear cooperation
Unless India can reprocess
safeguarded spent fuel in
safeguarded reprocessing
facilities, it will be saddled with
massive amounts of spent fuel.
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agreement, but a legislative stipulation, however
non-binding on India, will be the wrong way to go
about this issue.
An objective assessment of the proposed agreement
on civil nuclear cooperation indicates that there is
much to gain for both sides. India needs power for
its growth and if it can get this without having to
surrender its nuclear weapons option, it is a big gain.
For the US, India is clearly a potential partner and
an ally in its war against terror. India is also a big
market with a clear potential to grow in high
technology sectors like nuclear energy.  Clearly, it is
in both countries interest to cooperate in a vital area
like nuclear energy. However, the baggage of history
is an issue that both sides have to deal with. The
nonproliferation lobby is powerful in the US. The
anti-US lobby in the Indian political establishment is
also vocal and powerful. Decades of isolation have
made it difficult for the Indian technology elite to
believe that the US can be trusted.
The Joint Statement was an exceedingly bold and
daring first step to change the basic parameters of
the relationship between India and the US. Can
Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush rise above
the tumult of day-to-day problems and take farsighted
and bold decisions that build upon the path breaking
Joint Statement to transform the relations between
the two countries?
We believe that this is a worthwhile task to do both
for the US and India. The benefits of such cooperation
far outweigh any costs that the two sides may have
to incur to carry this deal through to fruition.
This aspect, more than anything, else should lead
to a positive outcome- a win win situation for both
sides. In sum, the Indo-US nuclear deal as
envisioned in the Joint Statement will fundamentally
transform relations between the two countries.
For this to happen, it is essential that the final
agreement between the two sides adhere not
only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Joint
Statement.
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